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Pouring Nonprobate Assets Into a
Testamentary Trust: A Half-Protected
Activity in Alaska
This Note examines the use of a testamentary trust as the recepta-
cle for transfers of nonprobate assets. First, this Note describes
the two principal objections that courts have raised with respect to
the designation of a testamentary trustee as the beneficiary of
nonprobate assets. Then, this Note evaluates statutory attempts to
address these two objections. Finally, this Note concludes that
recently proposed House Bill 308 could easily be revised to
provide Alaskans with comprehensive protection from the dangers
posed by both objections.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last half century, an enormous change has occurred
in both the nature of wealth and the way in which it is held.' So-
called "will substitutes" such as life insurance, pension and
retirement accounts, joint accounts and even revocable trusts have
become commonplace and increasingly significant in the asset
portfolios of middle and upper-income Americans. Will substitutes
permit the transfer of property at death through the use of
beneficiary designations. More importantly, however, will substi-
tutes transfer title in a way that completely avoids the probate
system. Thus, as the use of will substitutes has proliferated, the
traditional system of title-clearing through a probate court has
suffered a corresponding marginalization.
Part of the marginalization of the probate system can be traced
to popular resentment of it. Norman Dacey's bestseller How to
Avoid Probate,2 now in its fifth edition,3 reflects the widespread
public scorn that crystallized around the middle of this century.
The probate process has earned a reputation as an expensive,
Copyright © 1995 by Alaska Law Review
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awkward, delay-ridden system that many regard as little more than
"a tax imposed for the benefit of court functionaries and lawyers."4
Reacting to increasingly negative public sentiment against the
system, legislatures across the nation have adopted probate reform
measures aimed at simplifying procedures.5 The source of many
of these reforms has been the Uniform Probate Code of 1969
("UPC") and its revised versions.6 Alaska is no exception to this
trend. In recent decades, the Alaska legislature has enacted several
statutes either wholesale or in a substantially similar form to UPC
models.7 House Bill 308,8 moving through the current legislative
session, is the latest in this series of probate reforms. The Bill
contains language from articles II and VI of the 1990 UPC.9
Although discussion among members of the probate bar and recent
testimony before the Alaska House Judiciary Committee has
focused largely on the elective share provisions of article II and
counter-proposals by Alaska attorneys, 0 section 12 of the Bill
contains an important new chapter on nonprobate transfers taken
straight out of article VI of the UPC." This new chapter, deem-
ing a variety of contractual arrangements nontestamentary and thus
not subject to the probate system, will update an earlier UPC
section on nonprobate transfers adopted as Alaska Statutes section
13.31.070.12
By focusing on the use of a testamentary trust as the recepta-
cle for the nonprobate transfers referred to in the new chapter of
House Bill 308, this Note will highlight both the significance of the
new chapter and the ways in which it could be improved to give
testators in Alaska even more flexibility in planning their estates.
First, this Note will sketch the body of law that developed through
4. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1116.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. UNIF. PROB. CODE (1990). The Uniform Probate Code is a set of model
probate laws approved by both the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association.
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 81.
8. H.R. 308, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1995).
9. Letter from Arthur H. Peterson, Uniform Law Commissioner for Alaska,
to Terry Bannister, Legislative Counsel, Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency (Mar.
7, 1995) (on le with the Alaska Law Review).
10. Telephone Interview with Deborah H. Randall, Associate, Davis & Goerig,
Anchorage, Alaska (Oct. 24, 1995).
11. H.R. 308, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1995).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 13.31.070 (1972).
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judicial decisions dealing with the designation of a testamentary
trustee as beneficiary of one of these nonprobate assets, namely life
insurance. In particular, this Note will describe two principal
objections courts have raised and review the statutory reactions to
them. As Alaska has already dealt squarely with one of these
principal objections by statute, this Note will propose that the
second be addressed in the same way. Indeed, section 12 of House
Bill 308 could easily be revised to meet the second objection. If
this second objection is not addressed, a potential trap exists for
testators who choose to designate a testamentary trustee as
beneficiary of a nonprobate asset.
II. USE OF A TESTAMENTARY TRUST AS RECEPTACLE FOR
NONPROBATE TRANSFERS
Many individuals prefer the trust vehicle to outright transfers
of property because it commonly offers professional management
of assets and protection of principal for future generations. Given
the drawbacks associated with probate, many also prefer the use of
nonprobate instruments to pass property outside of the probate
system. Combining the advantages of the trust vehicle with those
of nonprobate instruments can significantly enhance the flexibility
and reduce the expense of post-mortem wealth transfers.
In a majority of states, testators desiring such a combination
have a choice between two functional equivalents. They can either
establish a trust during their lifetime, into which they may pour
both probate and nonprobate assets, 3 or they may opt to create
a trust in a will, into which they may pour the same types of assets.
Yet when a trust created in a will is designated as the receptacle
for nonprobate assets, concepts of trust, probate and nonprobate
law often become muddled.
At the heart of this confusion are the differing natures of inter
vivos and testamentary trusts. All trusts involve a transfer of
distinct property interests from an owner to a trustee and a
beneficiary. The trustee receives the legal interest, while the
beneficiary receives the equitable interest in the same property. If
such a transfer occurs during the lifetime of the transferror, or
settlor, an inter vivos trust is created. By contrast, if the settlor
provides for such a transfer in a validly executed will, a testamenta-
13. See Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act. This Act is found in
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-511 (1990).
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ry trust is created. It is precisely this interconnection between the
testamentary trust and the will that has spawned two concerns as
to the validity of using the testamentary trust as the receptacle for
will substitutes. More specifically, as one commentator noted,
[t]he dependence of the testamentary trust upon the will raises
the problem of whether the disposition violates the Statute of
Wills since the statutory formalities are not followed. Further,
when the policies are assigned to trustees to be named in the last
will, [some argue that] no trustees exist until the insured's last
will is legally established[,] raising the question whether a valid
trust has been created. Consequently, validity of such a trust is
uncertain. 4
These two principal issues-whether the disposition violates the
Statute of Wills and whether it constitutes a valid trust-are the
ones with which both courts and legislatures have grappled.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
No court in either Alaska or the Ninth Circuit has addressed
these issues in a reported decision. Other courts that have dealt
with these issues have done so only in the context of life insurance
proceeds payable to a trustee-beneficiary, and the results are
conflicting.
Life insurance beneficiary designations were the first of the
nonprobate contractual arrangements to be examined by the courts.
Courts in several jurisdictions considered the arguments that life
insurance by its very nature was a testamentary disposition and that
beneficiary designations were no more than testamentary disposi-
tions in violation of the Statute of Wills. 5 Some courts distin-
guished life insurance from property transmittable by will, observ-
ing that life insurance proceeds were owned by the beneficiary, not
the insured decedent at the time of his death. 6 Other courts
focused on life insurance as a contract between the insured and
insurer to make payment to a third-party beneficiary. Premiums
were said to be paid as consideration for the insurer's promise to
14. Note, The Testamentary Life Insurance Trust, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1118,1118
& n. 1 (1967) (emphasis added). This note specifically refers to life insurance, but
the concerns it cites are equally applicable to beneficiary designations of other
nonprobate instruments.
15. AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.3,
at 150 (4th ed. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Sigal v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 177 A. 742, 744
(Conn. 1935); Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 9 A.2d 581, 584 (Md. 1939).
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pay an agreed amount upon the death of the insured. 7 Regard-
less of the rationale employed, the results were the same: courts
held life insurance beneficiary designations to be nontestamentary
dispositions, even though they direct a transfer of property upon
the death of the insured. Thus, such designations are not subject
to the statutory formalities, such as attestation, required for the
valid execution of a will.
Having determined that life insurance was not to be regarded
as a testamentary disposition, courts next considered whether
designating a trustee of an inter vivos trust as beneficiary somehow
qualified as a testamentary disposition. Professor Austin Scott
summarizes the outcome of this examination, noting that "[t]he fact
that the policy is payable to a beneficiary as trustee for others
makes it no more testamentary than if it were payable to the
beneficiary absolutely."'"
The first court to consider the validity of an assignment of
life insurance policies to a trustee named or to be named in a will
was the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 9 In Frost v.
Frost, the court interpreted the phrase "my will" to refer to the
document finally admitted to probate. It then observed that until
the will was probated, the trustees to whom the beneficiary
designation referred could not finally be ascertained. The fact that
the assignments could therefore never take effect during the
lifetime of the testator led the court to conclude that they were
testamentary in nature. As such, they were required to comply
with the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Wills. According
to the court, "[t]he question is not simply whether, assuming the
validity of the assignments, the trust was good, but is much deeper,
and is whether the assignments upon which alone the trust depends
ever became operative in law."'  The court concluded that "these
assignments never took effect within the lifetime of the assignor,
for want of assignees, and never took effect after his death for want
of proper attestation."'" Here, the court's holding emphasized the
testamentary problem, as well as referring to a possible trust
creation problem.
17. See, e.g., Gumett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 191 N.E. 250, 253 (IM. 1934).
18. SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 15, § 57.3, at 150.
19. Frost v. Frost, 88 N.E. 446 (Mass. 1909).
20. Id. at 448.
21. Id.
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A. The Testamentary Objection
This same pair of objections was addressed by a California
court in In re Estate of Anderson v. Anderson.' There, the court
considered the effect of life insurance policies made payable to
"Bank of America Trust Department, as stipulated in my Will,
dated 1961."'  In considering two cases cited by the appellant,24
the court observed that a beneficiary designation naming a trust to
be created in an after-executed will was purely testamentary. It
further noted that "the same result follows where the policy merely
refers ... to 'my will,' since the obvious reference is to whatever will
may ultimately be admitted to probate."'  However, the court
went on to state that "a different result follows where-as in the
case at bench-the reference is to a will already executed and
specifically referred to."6 In that context, the will serves as a
document or memorandum incorporated by reference into the
insurance policies, thus effecting the creation of a valid inter vivos
insurance trust whose terms are identical to those of the testamen-
tary trust. Addressing the argument that the whole arrangement
was testamentary since the trustee did not receive the subject
matter of the trust-the life insurance proceeds-until after the
settlor's death, the court pointed out that "[t]he accepted doctrine
is to the contrary, the general rule being that the designation of the
trustee as immediate beneficiary of the policy is all that is re-
quired. '"27
In a more recent case, Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States v. Porter-Engelhart, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit examined a beneficiary designation directing the
payment of insurance proceeds to "the Trustee named in my Last
Will and Testament."'  In contrast to the Anderson court, the
Porter-Engelhart court applied the incorporation by reference
22. 236 Cal. App. 2d 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
23. Id. at 216.
24. Id at 218 (considering In re Estate of Rothenbuecher, 64 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1945); In re Myers' Estate, 164 A. 611 (Pa. 1933)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting In re Hemingway's Estate, 151 A.2d 472, 472-73 (Pa. 1959)).
27. Id. at 218-19 (citing AUSTIN W. ScOr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 84.1, at
646-48 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 cmt. f & § 84 cmt.
b (1959)).
28. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Porter-Engelhart,
867 F.2d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 1989).
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doctrine more broadly, allowing "my Last Will" to refer to a wiil
in existence at the time of the assignment.29 The result, again, was
the creation of a separate and distinct inter vivos trust whose terms
mirrored those of the testamentary trust. Despite the fact that the
assignor did not refer to a will by a specific date or offer any other
further description beyond "my Last Will," the court held that the
testator "explicitly referred to, and described, a preexisting, unique
and easily identifiable paper."'3
In distinguishing the case at bar from Frost-which ruled a
transfer testamentary in nature and therefore in violation of the
Statute of Wills 3 -the court observed that in Frost no will existed
at the time the beneficiary designation was made. In Porter-
Englehart, the court relied heavily on evidence that the testator
intended to distribute the insurance proceeds to his children
through a trust. The court observed that "[u]nlike in Frost, the
trust instructions were undeniably in the front of the insured's mind
when he designated the trustee as beneficiary."32
While the incorporation by reference doctrine has allowed
some courts to bypass the testamentary objection in cases where a
preexisting will containing a testamentary trust is at hand, such a
result is not entirely satisfying. First, it results in the creation of
two trusts: the intended testamentary trust and a separate inter
vivos trust with identical terms. Aside from the loss of administra-
tive economy that one trust would have provided, the existence of
two separate trusts may not be what the testator in fact intended.
Second, it makes a questionable distinction between those testators
who make beneficiary designations after executing a will containing
a testamentary trust, and those who make such designations before
executing such a will. Unless clear policy reasons exist for treating
one situation differently than the other, both should be treated
alike. The testator's intent, which prompted the use of the
incorporation by reference doctrine in the former scenario, seems
no less clear in the latter scenario.
B. The Valid Trust Objection
While some courts have focused on the testamentary objection,
others have chosen to focus exclusively on whether a valid trust is
29. Id. at 87.
30. Id.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
32. Id.
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created when a testamentary trustee is designated as a beneficiary.
Some courts conduct a narrow examination to determine whether
all essential trust elements are present,33 while others follow the
Porter-Englehart court's broader approach of construing the
language of beneficiary designations and wills together with facts
and circumstances to determine whether all required elements of
a valid inter vivos trust are present.34 Professor George Bogert
classifies the latter approach as one where "there was a valid inter
vivos trust which merely lacked trustees and that they were
provided by the will. 35
In general, a valid trust is created when the presence of a
trustee, a beneficiary and a sufficient trust res can be established.
In order to qualify as a valid inter vivos trust, some property
interest must pass during the lifetime of the settlor to the trustee
and to the beneficiary, which may be one and the same person.
Where the property interest passing is the right to receive the
proceeds of an insurance contract, and such rights can be extin-
guished at any time by the insured through a change in the
beneficiary designation, there is concern as to whether such
extinguishable rights properly may constitute a trust res. In
analyzing this interest, some courts have concluded that an interest
indeed passes that is a sufficient trust res, but they do not name the
interest.36 Professor Scott clarifies the nature of this interest,
observing that the beneficiary,
immediately acquires a chose in action, a claim against the
insurance company, although it is not enforceable by him until
the death of the insured, and even though the insured by
changing the beneficiary can divest his interest under the policy.
He has, however, until his interest is divested, an interest he can
hold in trust?7
Thus, a sufficient res may be deemed to exist and the validity of an
inter vivos insurance trust upheld.
In addition to the challenge to the sufficiency of the res, the
testamentary trust also faces a challenge to its validity based on the
existence of the trustee, who is only finally ascertained by the
probated will. On this point, it may again be helpful to refer to the
33. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Bloomfield Trust Co. 145 A.
735 (NJ. Ch. 1929).
34. See supra text accompanying note 32.
35. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRusTs § 22, at 57 (6th ed. 1987).
36. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (IIl. 1955).
37. SCoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 15, § 84.1, at 474.
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discussion of insurance above. In the insurance context, the effect
of death is not a condition precedent to the vesting of the benefici-
ary's rights; it is the inevitable contingency that determines the time
for payment of the proceeds. Similarly, in the testamentary trust
context, the effect of the testator's death is to complete the
assignment made in the beneficiary designation; it is not a condition
precedent to the existence of the trustee. The Frost court takes
note of this argument but discounts it by saying that "[w]hile it is
true ... that the trustees when finally ascertained would derive
their appointment under the assignment and not under the will, still
it remains equally true that they could not be appointed nor even
ascertained, until after the death of the assignor."3
However, it must be kept in mind that the Frost court issued
its opinion at a time when the judiciary's concept of insurance was
unsettled, and, in retrospect, not fully developed. Concepts of trust
law, now well-articulated by Professors Scott and Bogert, were also
less developed. The 1909 Frost court was not operating under the
same sets of assumptions that guide modem courts. Thus, a stark
difference in opinion is reflected in more recent decisions.
In Tootle-Lacy National Bank v. Rollier39 the Supreme Court
of Missouri was confronted with a situation in which the insured
designated a bank as trustee of one set of insurance policies, and
"the Trustees under the last will and testament of the Insured" as
the beneficiaries of a second set of policies.' Without even
addressing the two possible Frost objections to the latter set, the
court considered both sets together, holding that the beneficiary
designations created a separate and distinct inter vivos trust of the
insurance proceeds. Guided by what it called a "reasonable
construction and interpretation of the language used, considered in
light of the surrounding facts and circumstances," the court
concluded that the testator "intended that a trust of the same kind
and character and on the same conditions as that declared in the
will should apply to the proceeds."'" Clearly, the intent of the
settlor-testator, and not some technical flaw in trust creation, was
the controlling factor in this decision.
While some commentators have emphasized that the Tootle-
Lacy decision was related to the fact that the wife of the insured
38. Frost v. Frost, 88 N.E. 446, 447 (Mass. 1909).
39. 111 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. 1937).
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id.
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was committed to a hospital for the insane-implying that not only
her deceased husband, but the court itself felt a need to protect
her 2-- other courts have accorded similar weight to the intention
of the insured. In Prudential Insurance Company of America v.
Gatewood,43 the same court focused on the intent of the settlor-
insured to the exclusion of all other factors. The court outlined the
boundaries of its inquiry by stipulating that
[t]he essential question is, therefore, shall the intention of the
insured be thwarted upon the ground that the trust must fail
because the purpose cannot be ascertained, or are there other
facts and circumstances in the case whereby its purpose can be
ascertained and it may be made operative in the manner
intended by the insured?'
Drawing an analogy between the desire of the insured in Gatewood
to provide for his children and the desire of the insured in Tootle-
Lacy to provide for his wife, the court concluded that the designa-
tion of a bank as trustee for the insurance proceeds, without any
further mention of the terms of the trust, was designed to "incorpo-
rate by reference the terms and provisions of the trust created by
the will as the terms and provisions by which the trust created in
the proceeds of the policies was to be administered for the
exclusive benefit of the children."'45 Again, the intent of the
decedent and the incorporation by reference doctrine were used to
overcome any technical flaws in trust creation.
In United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of
Minneapolis,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
confronted a situation in which the insured named a bank, "under
the last Will and Testament of the insured," as beneficiary of two
life insurance policies, while naming the same bank, "under Trust
Agreement," as beneficiary of an additional two policies.47 The
will, which included a testamentary trust, made no reference to the
insurance policies. Weighing the alternative option that the
proceeds be turned over to the estate of the insured, the court
42, See Paul G. Haskell, Testamentary Trustee As Insurance Beneficiary: An
Estate Planning Gimmick, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 566, 578 (1966); Carl F. Schipper,
Jr., Designating Trustee Under Will As Beneficiary of Insurance-Legal Problems,
94 TR. & EST. 819, 821 (1955).
43. 317 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958).
44. Id. at 388.
45. Id. at 390.
46. 133 F.2d 886 (8th Cir. 1943).
47. Id. at 887.
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noted that the fact that the insured made the policies payable to a
specific beneficiary, here the bank as trustee, evidenced his
intention that they be included in a testamentary trust, which
existed for the benefit of his wife and daughter. The court
observed that such was "the intent and design of the insured in this
case is as manifest as it would be had he named his wife and
daughter beneficiaries in the policies."'  Here, in contrast to other
decisions focusing on the decedent's intent, insurance proceeds
actually flowed into a testamentary trust, rather than into a
judicially discovered inter vivos trust.
In Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue4 9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
also looked to the intention of the decedent in curing a possible
flaw in the testamentary trust. In this case, the insured did not
designate a trustee named or to be named in his will, but rather
named "Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Company, trustee" as the
beneficiary of insurance policies.5" Boston Safe Deposit and Trust
was also named in the insured's will as trustee of a testamentary
trust. Observing that the decedent had made no inter vivos trust
of which Boston Safe Deposit & Trust was the trustee, the court
found that the documents and circumstances appearing in the case,
disclose a clear intention on the part of the decedent to make
the wife and children the beneficiaries of the trust created by the
will, and to include in the corpus of that trust, for their benefit,
the proceeds of the policies... as though the policies had stated
that they were payable to the Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Company, trustee, under the trust set up in the will 5'
In directing that the proceeds pass to the testamentary trustee, as
though such designation had been made, the court not only gave
effect to what it discerned as the intent of the decedent, but also
acknowledged the validity of using the testamentary trust as a
single receptacle for probate and nonprobate assets.
Other courts have been less willing to cure perceived defects
in the testamentary trust to facilitate such transfers. In Prudential
Insurance Company of America v. Bloomfield Trust Co.,52 a New
Jersey court refused to correlate a life insurance policy made
payable to a trust company as trustee with a will providing for a
48. Id. at 888.
49. 100 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1938).
50. Id. at 266.
51. Id. at 267.
52. 145 A. 735 (NJ. Ch. 1929).
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testamentary trust with the same trust company as trustee. Noting
that the purported trust of the policy was silent as to its beneficia-
ries, and that the will made no mention of the insurance policy, the
court refused to allow reference to the will to complete the
insurance trust.5 3
In Pavy v. Peoples Bank and Trust Company,' an Indiana
court also adhered to a strict analysis of whether a beneficiary
designation of a trustee-beneficiary, without further mention of the
beneficiary or terms of trust, was effective to create a valid trust.
After setting out the essential legal requirements of valid forma-
tion, the court determined that the attempt to create an express
trust had failed. It noted that the will made no mention of the life
insurance and that the beneficiary designation did not refer to a
trustee under a will. The court then referred to Bloomfield Trust
Co. to conclude "that the insurance trust and the testamentary trust
cannot be correlated.""5  Despite its unwillingness to supply
missing elements of the insurance trust from the testamentary trust,
the court did imply that such a correlation is possible when the
beneficiary designation refers to a trustee under a will. Thus, while
not giving effect to what may indeed have been the intent of the
insured in this case, the court acknowledged that a properly worded
beneficiary designation might allow for correlation between the
policy and the testamentary trust.56 Such a designation would
permit the incorporation of the missing elements of the testamenta-
ry trust.
Similarly, a New York court has observed that, "assuming
arguendo that an insurance contract can be so framed as to provide
that the proceeds thereof shall be disposed of in such manner as
the insured shall direct in his last will, clear language would be
required to produce that result ... ."I The court found "no
language indicative of such intent,"'58 but nonetheless left the
possibility open. This dictum leaves the strong impression that the
use of the words "last will" would be sufficient to supply the
necessary elements to create a valid trust.
53. Id. at 736.
54. 195 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. App. 1964).
55. Id. at 867.
56. Id.
57. Bellinger v. Bellinger, 46 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943).
58. Id.
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As the above decisions indicate, there is hardly unanimity in
the approach courts have taken to resolving the questions raised by
the designation of a testamentary trustee as beneficiary of a life
insurance policy. Some courts have analyzed the problem using the
law of wills, while other courts have applied principles of trust law.
In sorting through the varied decisions, it is interesting to note that
no court has squarely addressed both of the objections articulated
in Frost.59 The Porter-Engelhart court, in interpreting Massachu-
setts law, had the ideal forum in which to counter or clarify the
arguments made in Frost. Instead, it chose to distinguish Frost and
employ the incorporation by reference doctrine to save the
beneficiary designations. The court's emphatic declaration that the
testator "explicitly referred to, and described, a preexisting, unique
and easily identifiable paper"'6 when, in reality, he made refer-
ence only to his last will in the beneficiary designation, seems to
reflect a deliberate attempt by the court to save the testator from
his own vagueness where his intent is otherwise clear. This strong
emphasis on the intent of the decedent-seen clearly in the Tootle-
Lacy, Gatewood, First National Bank and Boston Safe Deposit
cases-and the attendant use of the doctrine of incorporation by
reference, indicates that the courts are unable to offer more than
slender rationalizations in response to the objections raised'nearly
a century ago by Frost. Although such rationalizations have been
accepted by courts in the context of insurance and inter vivos
insurance trusts, and are arguably similarly applicable where
testamentary trusts are concerned, such an application would
require yet another expansion of an already complicated web of
legal doctrines.
The desired result in making these beneficiary designations is
rather simple: it is simply to pour assets that are not subject to the
probate system into a trust created by a will. The tendency of
some courts to recharacterize such transfers as testamentary
dispositions or attack the validity of the intended trust has led to
a continuing skirmish over where and how to draw the line
distinguishing wealth transfers subject to probate from those that
are not. Drawing this line through the middle of the trust realm,
thereby distinguishing the use of an inter vivos trust from that of
59. Note, supra note 14, at 1131.
60. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Porter-Engelhart,
867 F.2d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 1989).
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a testamentary trust, has led to needless frustration of testators'
intentions. Such a system creates a safe harbor for those who are
informed and willing to use an inter vivos trust, while leaving those
who elect the testamentary trust to take their chances, often
without any warning of the risk they face.
IV. STATUTORY REACIONS
Legislatures in many states have recognized this dilemma.
Unable to discern any policy reasons for distinguishing between
those who pour nonprobate assets into inter vivos trusts and those
who pour the same kinds of assets into testamentary trusts, a
majority of states have enacted statutes that facilitate, in varying
degrees, the designation of a testamentary trustee as a beneficiary
of nonprobate assets.6 ' These statutes can be separated into
roughly three categories in accordance with how they deal with the
Frost objections: (1) some confront the testamentary objection
while remaining silent as to the possible valid trust objections; (2)
others address only the trust validity issues, while remaining silent
on the testamentary objection; and (3) still others deal with both
the testamentary and valid trust objections, providing testators with
maximum flexibility and protection.
A. Statutes Addressing the Testamentary Objection
The first statutory approach has its roots in the original UPC's
section 6-201, which deemed the designation of a beneficiary for
61. ALASKA STAT. § 13.31.070 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-6101
(1995); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6321 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-15-
101 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-451 (West 1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 733.808 (West 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 514-5 (Smith-Hurd
1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-16 (Bums 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-441
(1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1881 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
A, § 6-201 (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-105 (1991); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.256 (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-7-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 456.030 (Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-207 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-503.01 (1993); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 13-3.3 (McKinney Supp.
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-100 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.64
(Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ti. 84, § 305 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 128.480 (1990); PURDON'S PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1975); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-510 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-103 (1991); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.49-3 (West 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3112 (Michie
1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.170 (West 1987); W. VA. CODE § 44-5-11
(1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.09 (West 1981).
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certain assets, such as insurance policies and pension plans, to be
nontestamentary.62 Alaska has adopted this same language in
Alaska Statutes section 13.31.070. 63  According to the UPC
Comment, "[t]he sole purpose of this section is to eliminate the
testamentary characterization from the arrangements." 64  A
variety of contractual modes of transfer were deemed non-
testamentary because, in the words of the Comment, "there appear
to be no policy reasons for continuing to treat these varied
arrangements as testamentary... [when] the same courts have for
years upheld the beneficiary designations in life insurance con-
tracts."'65 In 1989, a new section 6-101 replaced and revised the
former section 6-201 by expanding the list of beneficiary designa-
tions deemed nontestamentary to include such assets as individual
retirement plans, employee benefit plans and "other written
instrument[s] of a similar nature., 66 Section 12 of House Bill 308
would make the same changes by replacing Alaska Statutes section
13.31.070 with language virtually identical to UPC section 6-101.67
62. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-201 (1969) (amended 1989). Subsections 6-201(a)
and 6-201(b) contain the following text:
(a) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract of
employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement,
pension plan, trust agreement, conveyance or any other written
instrument effective as a contract, gift, conveyance or trust is deemed to
be nontestamentary, and this Code does not invalidate the instrument or
any provision:
(1) That money or other benefits theretofore due to, controlled
or owned by a decedent shall be paid after his death to a person
designated in either the instrument or in a separate writing
including a will, executed at the same time as the instrument or
subsequently;
(2) That any money due or to become due under the instru-
ment shall cease to be payable in the event of the death of the
promisee or the promisor before payment or demand; or
(3) That any property which is the subject of the instrument
shall pass to a person designated by the decedent in either the
instrument or a separate writing, including a will, executed at
the same time as the instrument or subsequently.
(b) Nothing in this section limits the rights of creditors under the laws
of this State.
63. ALAsKA STAT. § 13.31.070 (1972). Maine has also adopted the language
of Subsection 6-201 in ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 6-201 (West 1964).
64. UNEF. PROB. CODE § 6-201 cmt. (1969) (amended 1989).
65. Id.
66. Id § 6-101 (1990).
67. Section 6-101 contains the following text:
(a) A provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in an insurance
policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note,
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Both the wholesale adoption of UPC sections and the
enactment of statutes declaring certain asset transfers to be
nontestamentary6 are reactions by legislators to judicial decisions
that seemed to draw artificial distinctions among nonprobate assets.
Both embody modem assumptions about nonprobate transfers on
death, as well as the attitude that legislation should facilitate such
transfers, not subject them to formalities and legal doctrines that
are inconsistent with their nature. Nevertheless, these statutes fail
to deflect possible trust law objections.
B. Statutes Addressing Valid Trust Objections
A number of states have recognized the potential of trust law
objections to foil intended transfers of nonprobate assets into inter
vivos and testamentary trusts. Some of these states have responded
with legislation that simply declares, without further explanation,
that a settlor may create either type of trust upon the proceeds of
one or more nonprobate assets. 69  Other states have addressed
possible trust law objections to a testamentary trust by enacting
statutes specifying that a trustee named by will may be designated
certificated or uncertificated security, account agreement, custodial
agreement, deposit agreement, compensation plan, pension plan,
individual retirement plan, employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance,
deed of gift, marital property agreement, or other written instrument of
a similar nature is nontestamentary. This subsection includes a written
provision that:
(1) money or other benefits due to, controlled by, or owned by
a decedent before death must be paid after the decedent's death
to a person whom the decedent designates either in the
instrument or in a separate writing, including a will, executed
either before or at the same time as the instrument, or later;
(2) money due or to become due under the instrument ceases
to be payable in the event of death of the promisee or the
promisor before payment or demand; or
(3) any property controlled by or owned by the decedent before
death which is the subject of the instrument passes to a person
the decedent designates either in the instrument or in a separate
writing, including a will, executed either before or at the same
time as the instrument, or later.
(b) This section does not limit rights of creditors under other laws of this
State.
The proposed replacement section, which would be named Alaska Statutes
§ 13.33.101, is identical, except for the deletion of the word "any" before
"property" in subsection (a)(3). Arizona recently adopted the same language in
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-6101 (1994).
68. See, e.g., PURDON'S PA. CONS. ANN. § 6108 (1975).
69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1881 (West 1991).
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as a beneficiary." Under those statutes, however, it remains
unclear if such statements cover both wills in existence when the
designation is made and wills executed after the designation.
Michigan legislation validates the transfer of nonprobate assets only
in the former instance.7' Statutes in several other states declare
the trust valid in both cases, allowing the designation of a trustee
named or to be named by will.72 Another approach, taken by
North Carolina, is to combine the named or to be named by will
language with an explicit statement that the interest of a trustee as
beneficiary is sufficient to support the creation of an inter vivos or
testamentary trust.73 This type of statute thus addresses both the
trustee and res objections discussed above.74
Despite their elimination of possible trust law objections to the
designation of a testamentary trustee as beneficiary of a non-
probate asset, all of these statutes fail to counter the possible
testamentary objection. For example, the case notes following the
North Carolina statute refer to case law affirming the non-
testamentary nature of life insurance proceeds but fail to refer to
other nonprobate assets This reliance on the courts to safe-
guard nonprobate assets from the testamentary objection does not
offer the same measure of certainty as provided by legislation like
UPC section 6-101 and its progeny. Such judicial decisions are
unlikely to cover the broad range of nonprobate assets deemed
nontestamentary under the uniform statutes. Additionally, it is
simply more efficient and straightforward to address both sets of
objections at the same time in the same statute. The use of a
statute to answer one set of objections, while remaining silent as to
the other exposes the testator to needless risk and uncertainty.
70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-451 (West 1992); MiSS. CODE
ANN. § 83-7-7 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.64 (Baldwin 1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 305 (1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 128.480 (1990); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 3.49-3 (West 1981).
71. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.256 (1995).
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.808 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 456.030 (Vernon 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3112 (Michie 1994); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 11.98.170 (West 1987).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-100 (1977).
74. See supra Part III.B.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-100 (1977).
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C. Statutes Addressing Both Testamentary and Valid Trust
Objections
States recognizing the vulnerability of testators to both
testamentary and trust validity objections have adopted statutes
addressing both. In a brief subsection in its chapter on nonprobate
transfers to trustees named in a decedent's will, California expressly
allows for the designation of a trustee named or to be named in the
will as beneficiary 6 As in other states, such language is inserted
in the statute to counter the allegation that the testamentary trust
fails for lack of a trustee. In allowing for beneficiary designations
of a testamentary trustee both before and after a will containing a
testamentary trust has been executed, the California statute places
paramount emphasis on giving effect to the intent of a testator. If
the testator takes the pains to make such a designation as well as
to provide for a testamentary trust in his will, the order in which
these actions occurred will not matter for purposes of trust validity.
This approach also obviates the need to rely on the incorporation
by reference doctrine and other fictions used by courts to save
intended trusts.
In addition to eliminating traditional trust law objections, the
California statute also deals squarely with the possible testamentary
objection by expressly stating that the beneficiary designation is not
required to comply with the Statute of Wills. Thus, California
testators are afforded far greater clarity and certainty in pouring
nonprobate assets into testamentary trusts.
Colorado has taken a somewhat different path to the same
end. It has combined the security and advantages of UPC section
6-101 with statutory language dismissing classic trust law objec-
76. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6321 (West Supp. 1995). This section contains the
following text:
An instrument may designate as a primary or contingent beneficiary,
payee, or owner a trustee named or to be named in the will of the person
entitled to designate the beneficiary, payee, or owner. The designation
shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the contract or plan
or, in the absence of such provisions, in a manner approved by the
insurer if an insurance, annuity, or endowment contract is involved, and
by the trustee, custodian, or person or entity administering the contract
or plan, if any. The designation may be made before or after the
execution of the designator's will and is not required to comply with the
formalities for execution of a will.
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tions. Although not quite as broad as the California statute in
terms of the beneficiary designation flexibility it offers to testators,
the Colorado statute does encompass the entire range of non-
testamentary contractual arrangements enumerated in the uniform
law. After addressing the possible testamentary objection to such
designations in subsection (1), the statute shifts its focus to possible
trust law objections in subsection (2). More specifically, the
Colorado statute expressly permits the designation of a testamenta-
ry trustee, eliminating the question as to the trustee's existence
when a testamentary trust is used. Perhaps unwisely, the statute
stipulates that the will containing the testamentary trust must
predate the beneficiary designation. The rationale for this
requirement is not offered, but one might assume that some sort of
strict logic or legal doctrine such as the incorporation by reference
principle is in play here. In any regard, the existence of the will
containing the testamentary trust will provide a clear set of trust
elements guaranteeing the existence of a valid trust. Finally, the
Colorado statute affirms that the right to receive benefits under the
beneficiary designation will constitute a sufficient trust res,
rounding out the arsenal in subsection (2) with which it could
defend against a trust law attack. Much like the California statute,
the Colorado statute deflects both testamentary and present trust
attacks. Again, this hybrid allows Colorado to cover more
scenarios than each of the statutes might reach individually.
V. CONCLUSION
As the above statutory survey reveals, Alaska is already half-
way toward the goal of shielding testators by statute from the
objections raised nearly a century ago by the Frost court. 8 Much
has changed in the area of wills and trusts since that time, but each
77. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-15-101 (Supp. 1990). Subsection (1) sets out the
language of UPC section 6-101 verbatim. Subsection (2) includes the following
text:
Under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, it is permissible to
designate as a beneficiary, payee, or owner a trustee named in an inter
vivos or testamentary trust in existence at the date of such designation.
It is not necessary to the validity of any such trust that there be in
existence a trust corpus other than the right to receive the benefits or to
exercise the rights resulting from such a designation. It is also permissi-
ble to designate as a beneficiary, payee, or owner a trustee named in, or
ascertainable under, the will of the designator.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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objection still carries some currency in jurisdictions where courts
and legislators have not yet addressed one or both.
Aside from guarding against the uncertainties articulated by
the courts, a far more compelling reason exists for eliminating
remaining uncertainty by statute. Giving effect to the reasonable
intentions of testators has become a universal principal guiding the
action of courts and legislatures alike. As many of the judicial
decisions in this area indicate, modem courts are often willing to
employ whatever legal fiction might be appropriate to achieve a
decedent's clearly manifested intention.79 Legislatures have also
taken an activist posture as far as sanctioning the intentions of
decedents who elect to pass property through nonprobate channels.
A prime example of such activism is the adoption in almost all
fifty states of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act8
or something equivalent. Alaska is no exception to this rule,
having codified the exact language of the uniform act in Alaska
Statutes section 13.11.200.1 This legislation was enacted to
resolve the myriad of problems and the contradicting judicial
79. See supra text accompanying notes 39-51.
80. The Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act is found in UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-511 (1969) (amended 1990). The Act contains the following text:
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determined by the law of
this state, may be made by a will to the trustee of a trust established or
to be established by the testator or by the testator and some other person
or by some other person (including a funded or unfunded life insurance
trust, although the trustor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of
the insurance contracts) if the trust is identified in the testator's will and
its terms are set forth in a written instrument (other than a will) executed
before or concurrently with the execution of the testator's will or in the
valid last will of a person who has predeceased the testator (regardless
of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust). The devise
is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the
trust was amended after the execution of the will or after the death of
the testator. Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the property
so devised (1) is not deemed to be held under a testamentary trust of the
testator but becomes a part of the trust to which it is given and (2) shall
be administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the
instrument or will setting forth the terms of the trust, including any
amendments thereto made before the death of the testator (regardless of
whether made before or after the execution of the testator's will), and,
if the testator's will so provides, including any amendments to the trust
made after the death of the testator. A revocation or termination of the
trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse.
81. ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.200 (1972).
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authority surrounding the validity of pour-over wills.' All these
problems were addressed by legislation affirming that what the
testator wants to do may be done, despite any common law
doctrine to the contrary." Such a statutory solution was critically
needed in the pour-over will context and is equally important in the
nonprobate asset beneficiary designation context.
Enacting a validating statute to resolve the remaining trust law
objections surrounding nonprobate transfers into testamentary
trusts is appropriate for two reasons. First, Alaska Statutes section
13.31.070 and its proposed replacement in section 12 of House Bill
308 already address the testamentary objections.8" Second, the
pour-overs sanctioned by Alaska Statutes section 13.11.200 are
functionally equivalent to pour-overs of nonprobate assets into a
testamentary trust. South Carolina has recognized the functional
equivalency of these pour-overs and has thus included statutory
language permitting pour-overs of nonprobate assets into testamen-
tary trusts in the same section in which it adopts the Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trust Act." Indiana, Maryland and
Washington have similarly sanctioned all nonprobate transfers to
82. See PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRA-
TION 95 (1987).
83. Id. at 96.
84. See supra text accompanying note 12.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-510 (Law. Co-op. 1987). Subsection (a) sets out
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act exactly as it appears in section
2-511 of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code. Subsection (b) validates the pour-over
of death benefits of any kind into inter vivos trusts. Subsection (c) validates the
pour-over of death benefits of any kind into testamentary trusts using the following
language:
Death benefits of any kind, including but not limited to proceeds of life
insurance policies and payments under an employee's trust, or contract
of insurance purchased by such a trust, forming part of a pension, stock-
bonus, or profit-sharing plan, or under a retirement annuity contract, may
be paid to a trustee named, or to be named, in a will which is admitted to
probate as the last will of the insured or the owner of the policy, or the
employee covered by such plan or contract, as the case may be, whether
or not such will is in existence at the time of such designation. Upon the
admission of such will to probate, and the payment thereof to the trustee,
such death benefits shall be administered and disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the testamentary trust created by the will of the
testator. Such payments shall be deemed to pass directly to the trustee
of the testamentary trust and shall not be deemed to have passed to or
be receivable by the executor of the estate of the insured, employee, or
annuitant.
(emphasis added).
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either inter vivos or testamentary trusts in one consolidated
statute. 6
Alaska can easily follow suit by adding a few statutory lines to
eliminate the potential trust law objections that linger over
nonprobate transfers into testamentary trusts. One need not search
beyond the text of the California and Colorado enactments for the
requisite language. As Alaska has already met the testamentary
challenge through its enactment of UPC section 6-201, and appears
poised to broaden this language through the adoption of revised
section 6-101, the Colorado model of augmenting the UPC text
would offer the most convenient route to comprehensive protection
of testators.87 However, some of the language chosen by Colora-
do legislators places unnecessary limitations on the testator by
requiring the testamentary trust to be "in existence at the date [the
beneficiary is designated].""8  As noted above, this restriction
allows for the employment of the incorporation by reference
doctrine, but it fails to protect testators whose beneficiary designa-
tions predate the execution of a will containing a testamentary
trust.
If the motivating factor is to give effect to testators' intentions
as they attempt to use a testamentary trust as a receptacle for
nonprobate assets, and, more generally, to avoid disparities in
outcome where functional equivalents are involved, then Calif-
ornia's broader language is preferable. 9 This language could even
be shortened to the following:
An instrument referred to in subsection (a) of this section [pro-
posed Alaska Statutes section 13.33.101IUPC section 6-101] may
designate as a beneficiary, payee or owner, a trustee named or
to be named in the will of the person entitled to make such a
designation. The designation may be made before or after the
execution of the designator's will. It is not necessary to the
validity of the underlying trust that there be in existence a trust
corpus other than right to receive the benefits or to exercise the
rights resulting from such a designation.
These three additional sentences, whether appended to
proposed Alaska Statutes section 13.33.101 or added to Alaska
Statutes section 13.11.200, would go a long way toward protecting
86. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-16 (Burns 1994); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRusTs § 11-105 (1991); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.98.170 (1984).
87. See supra note 77.
88. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-15-101 (2) (Supp. 1990).
89. See supra note 76.
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Alaskan testators from the pitfalls highlighted in the case law of
jurisdictions in which no such statute exists. The addition could
easily be added to section 12 of House Bill 308 as it moves through
the Alaska House of Representatives in January and thereafter to
the Senate. Failure to take further legislative action in an area
already partially governed by statute leaves testators with one foot
on solid ground and the other in a potential quagmire.
Sean Kendall Murphy

